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Abstract 
 
The purpose of present paper is to complement the conventional currency 
demand approach in the estimates of the size of underground economy by 
integrating it into a dynamic general equilibrium model. Our analysis 
demonstrated that it is not the current taxation burden that matters, but rather, 
it is the fiscal regime that affects both current and future taxation burdens that 
matters. Whether increasing current tax rates could have induced households 
to participate in underground activities depends on the path of government 
expenditure. Higher current tax rates along with a cut in government spending 
that signal a lower future tax burdens may indeed produce a smaller size of 
underground economy. On the flip side, lower current tax rates combined with 
increasing government spending that hint at greater future tax burdens could 
kick off a rising size of underground economy. We also uncover that the trend 
of the size of underground economy, after taking the fiscal condition into 
account, is in line with the existing literature on the role of underground 
economy as risk-sharing mechanism. After the adjustment for fiscal regime, 
we find that the size of underground economy in Malaysia, on general, is 
relatively smaller vis-à-vis the conventional measurement.     
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1. Introduction 
 
The existence of underground economy around the world is beyond 
doubt. Quantifying the size of the underground economy, from a conceptual 
and practical nature, however, is likely to be no better than “guesstimation” 
(Dixon 1999). Despite the significant number of measuring methods to date 
that has been used to estimate the size of underground economy1, the currency 
demand approach has stand out by virtue of her well established presence in 
the empirical literature2.The simplicity in estimation procedure, coupled with 
its well grounded assumption that cash is the vital if not solely mean of 
payments used in the underground economy, has undoubtedly underlay the 
widely acceptance of currency demand approach. Its often-criticized single 
focus on tax rate as the driving force of underground economy has indeed 
turned out to be the foolproof resistance to the fragility that the more 
complicated MIMIC approach encounters, that is, high sensitivity to the 
causes and indicators under contemplation3. Furthermore, this approach has 
been resurfacing recently, as shown by the works of Hill and Kabir (2000), 
Schneider (1997, 1999) and Gadea and Serrano-Sanz (2002).   
In this vein, the present paper attempts to contribute to improving the 
estimates of the size of underground economy by integrating this most widely 
used currency demand approach into a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
From there we derive a currency demand function to be estimated 
econometrically, in which the coefficients of average tax revenue and output 
will determine the relative size of the underground economy.  
In retrospect, Tanzi (1980, 1982) regressed on a currency demand 
function that contains weighted average tax rate, proportion of wages and 
salaries in national income, interest rate on saving deposits, and per capital 
income as a function of share of circulated currency in broad money. The main 
idea is that a rise in the size of underground economy will cause an increase in 
demand for currency. In other words, an excess demand for currency, thanks 
to the tax-driven underground activities, provides estimates of the size of the 
underground economy. Following Tanzi’s line of thought, we try to figure out 
a distinction between the behavior of circulated currency M, nominal GDP, 
and tax revenue in Malaysia from 1970 to 2005, as depicted in Table 1.  
Given the assumption of constant velocity of circulation, for an 
economy without underground sectors we should witness both circulated 
currency and nominal GDP sharing identical cyclical movements 
tttt PDGEME ˆˆ 11 −− =   
                                                 
1 See Schneider and Enste (2000) for an excellent survey on different estimation methods 
proposed in the literature. 
2 Cagan (1958) and Guttman (1977) first initiated the currency demand approach, which, 
subsequently improved by Tanzi (1980, 1983). 
3 It should be noted that the MIMIC approach needs an external source of cardinal reference 
value or benchmark to transform its ordinal estimates to cardinal values, to which, the 
currency demand approach has been referred by most of the researchers using MIMIC 
approach.   
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where E denotes the expectation operator, and a hat over the variable refers to 
its deviation from steady state. By the same token, the cyclical components of 
circulated currency should be as fluctuate as those of nominal income 
)ˆ()ˆ( tt PDGVarMVar = . 
 
 
Table 1: Some facts on currency demand and taxation 
 
* The data is detrended by using Hodrick-Prescott filter at 100=λ . 
 
However, as clear from Table 1, tPDG ˆ is only moderately correlated 
with tMˆ . The missing part could not be well explained even if the assumption 
of constant velocity of circulation is relaxed. Plus, the cyclical components of 
tax revenue is also moderately correlated to tMˆ , though to lesser extent. More 
important, a look at the changes and fluctuations clarifies the picture further.  
Surprisingly, changes in cyclical GDP are inversely related to the 
changes in cyclical circulated currency. Put it differently, any additional 
cyclical demand for cash balances must be from other sources, among others, 
underground activities. Positive correlations between the cyclical movements 
of tax revenue, as the major cause of underground economy, and circulated 
currency, alongside as strong positive correlation between the fluctuation in 
tax revenue and in circulated currency, signal that currency demand approach 
remains valid and highly valuable.         
Seen from this light, we proposed a dynamic currency demand 
approach, which complements the conventional currency demand approach by 
offering additional insights. We find that the impact of taxation burden on the 
size of underground economy is conditional on the fiscal regime. In particular, 
it is not the current taxation burden that matters. Rather, it is the fiscal regime 
that affects both current and future taxation burdens that matters. Whether 
increasing current tax rates could have induced households to participate in 
underground activities depends on its counterpart, that is, government 
expenditure. Worsening (improving) fiscal conditions, with limited sources of 
taxation, tends to raise (lower) the expectation on future distorting direct tax 
rates, and thus cause larger (smaller) size of underground economy. 
Besides, we uncover that the trend of the size of underground economy, 
after taking the fiscal condition into account, is in line with the existing 
literature on the role of underground economy as risk-sharing mechanism. In 
the wave of recession, one should expect a rise in the size of underground 
economy as the recession-induced unemployed workers have substituted into 
the underground activities. Note that expansionary fiscal stance, be it rising 
government expenditure or falling tax collection, more often than not comes 
 Correlation 
 Cyclical 
components* 
Growth rate 3-year standard 
deviation 
GDP and currency 
Tax revenue and currency 
0.563 
0.244 
-0.414 
0.223 
0.631 
0.773 
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after the recession. This means the conventional currency demand approach 
that depends on falling current tax rates will mistakenly predict the evolution 
of the size of underground economy. In this respect, the dynamic currency 
demand approach that also considers future taxation burden, as shown later, 
has performed better.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
the dynamic general equilibrium model economy with and without 
underground economy. The dynamic currency demand approach is then 
derived. Section 3 presents the econometric estimation of the size of 
underground economy in Malaysia from 1970 to 2005. Section 4 puts the 
fiscal regime under consideration, and performs the adjusted size of 
underground economy. Section 5 concludes.       
 
2. The Dynamic General Equilibrium Model 
 
In this section, we present a standard dynamic general equilibrium 
model and derive the money demand function for an economy with and 
without underground economy.  
 
2.1 The environment 
 
The sequences of events occur as follows: at the beginning of every 
date t a continuum of measure one of ex-ante identical households are 
endowed by real stocks of capital 1−K and balances 1−M . Given the anticipated 
realization of the stochastic shock tZ , the households provide labor services 
s
tN  and rent their endowed real capital stock to the firms for production tY . 
The real wages tt PW and return on real capital tr  are respectively 
determined by their marginal products. Firms hire labors and capital according 
to the combinations as in the standard Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Funded by the returns of factors, profit tΩ , and government lump-sum 
transfer MtG via money creation 
t
tt
P
MM 1−− , the households will decide how 
much to spend on the consumption of the unique non-storable goods tC  at the 
prevailing price tP , and to save in the form of real stocks of capital and cash 
balance for next period. Note that unilateral transfer of MtG is net wealth for 
household. 
 
2.2 The standard competitive economy 
 
The household’s expected utility at date 0 is given by  
 
( )∑∞
=
−


 


+−−−+0
1
0 loglog11
1
)1(
1
t t
t
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MNCE θσρ
σ    (1) 
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The utility function (1) shares the usual assumptions of concavity and 
differentiability. The reciprocal of σ  and θ , respectively, denote the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution between current and future 
consumptions, and interest elasticity of currency demand. ρ  is the subjective 
discount rate. 
The production function takes the form 
αα −
−= 11 tttt NKZY         (2) 
 
Definition 1.  
A sequential competitive equilibrium is a sequence of allocations { }∞=0,,, ttttt KMNC  and prices { }∞=0, tttt rPW  t∀ such that 
(i) Household maximizes (1) subject to 
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(iii) Market clearing:  
d
t
s
t NN = ,          (5) 
(iv) AR(1) Markov process of technological shock in the form 
ttZt ZZZ ερ ++−= −1)1(  ),0(...~ σε Ndiit    (6) 
(v) A perpetual inventory model in the form 
ttt IKK +−= −1)1( δ        (7) 
(vi) Fiscal regime where 
M
t
t
tt G
P
MM =− −1         (8) 
(vii) Feasibility 
1
1
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−
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The resultant efficiency conditions are 
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Simultaneous interpretation of (10) and (11) such that 
 
t
t
s
t
t
P
W
N
C =
σ
         (16) 
 
Equation (12) is the Euler equation. Equation (13) states the optimal 
condition for holding real balances, while Equations (14) and (15) are the 
marginal product of labor and capital. The equation (16) has three important 
features about the labor supply. First, holding real wage constant, household 
labor supply is directly related to household consumption. Intuitively, to fund 
more consumption requires more hard works. Here the income effect comes 
into play. Second, holding consumption fixed, labor supply varies inversely 
with the real wage. This is because a higher real wage, given hours of work, 
makes leisure less costly. In other words, household could enjoy more leisure 
time without compromising the amount of income earned. The substitution 
effect thus dominates. Third, if both consumption and real wage arise 
proportionally, both income and substitution effects on labor are 
counterbalanced. There is no change in the labor supply. 
 
Proposition 1 
Demand for cash balances is a function of total income and 
opportunity cost of holding cash balances. 
Proof. First we combine (10), (11) and (14) to rewrite the consumption as a 
product of labor share of income,  
 
tt YC )1( ασ −= .         
 
Together, (10), and (12)-(13) show that  
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Correspondingly, demand for cash balances varies directly and inversely with 
total income and nominal interest rate. ■ 
 
2.3 A dynamic general equilibrium model with tax-driven underground 
activities 
 
2.3.1 Household 
For an economy that comprises underground goods and labor markets, 
we could rewrite respective utility function and labor disutility as 
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M
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Household can now work in both official and underground markets 
with respective real wages of t
M
t PW  and t
U
t PW , with the former enjoys a 
wage premium 1>κ  over the latter. Note that labor supply is not indivisible. 
Rather, household can involve simultaneously in both markets. However, the 
income tax rate Wtτ , to which only the official labor market is subjected, will 
influence household’s decision on labor allocation for official and 
underground labor markets.  
Household’s budget constraint turns out to be 
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2.3.2 Firm 
 
Now, let us turn the analysis to the firm, which could employ two 
modes of production. On one hand, firm utilizes capital stocks and official 
labor services for market goods production MtY , as in (2). On the other hand, 
firm uses labors from underground labor market UtN to produce underground 
goods UtY  in a simple production function that exhibits constant returns to 
scale 4 . For the sake of simplicity, we assume an identical technological 
process across the modes of production. 
αα −
−= 11 dMtttMt NKZY ,  dUttUt NZY =    (21) 
 
Firm’s profit function, therefore, is rewritten as 
 
1)()1( −+−−−+−=Ω ttdUt
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R
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Only the revenue of market goods is subject to the revenue taxation. 
 
                                                 
4 This assumption is in contrast to the existing practice, for instance, Busato and Chriani 
(2004), and Conesa et al. (2001, 2002), on modeling underground production that assumes 
decreasing return on scale. None the less, as we do not consider penalty of being caught, in 
which its probability is directly related to the scale of production, the assumption of constant 
return to scale is not inappropriate.   
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2.3.3 Fiscal regime 
 
Consider the following government budget constraint. 
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tΛ  refers to the share of distorting taxation in the financing of non-monetized 
government spending NMtG . Unlike (8), lump-sum government transfer of 
NM
tG is not a wealth for household as it is financed by taxation. As we will see 
later, tΛ  conveys the importance of fiscal regime, instead of current taxation 
burden per se, in the determination of the size of underground economy. 
 
Definition 2.  
 
A sequential competitive equilibrium with underground economy is a 
sequence of allocations { }∞=0,,,,, tttsUtsMtUtMt KMNNCC , and prices { }∞=0,,, tRtWtttMt rPW ττ  t∀  such that 
(i) Household maximizes (1) subject to (17) – (19) 
(ii) Firm solves (22) subject to (21) 
(iii) Market clearing:  
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t
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(iv) The progress of technology and capital accumulation as in (6) and 
(7) 
(v) Fiscal regime  
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(vi) Feasibility  
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   where 1=Λ t , UtMtt YYY += .  
 
The efficiency conditions are 
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Equation (26) indicates that, given the assumption of uniqueness of 
goods, both marginal utility of consumption on market and underground goods 
fluctuate according to the marginal utility of wealth. Equation (28) equates the 
marginal disutility of work in underground labor market and its real wage. 
Equations (29) and (30) are marginal product of capital and market labor 
distorted by revenue tax. The standard Euler equation and optimal condition 
on holding cash balances duplicate (12) and (13).    
The product of (26), (27), and (30), as what follows, has altered the 
decision on labor supply in (16). 
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Assume that 1<Λ t . First, holding real wage constant, at the prevailing 
tax rates, increases in household’s consumption may require less hard works in 
official labor markets. In other words, it is the production of underground 
goods that attract more labor participations in underground labor market that 
satisfies the rise in total consumption. The intuition is if government is unable 
to levy lump sum tax or other non-distorting indirect tax, given NMtG , 1<Λ t  
implies higher future taxation burden. Household therefore reacts against the 
expectation of higher future taxation burden by participating in underground 
economy. 
Second, holding consumption fixed, the inverse relationship between 
labor supply in market production and real market wage has been strengthened. 
This is because a higher real wage, given hours of work, implies greater 
income tax burden, which in turn makes working in official labor market more 
costly. However, the cost of leisure could remain unchanged. After all, higher 
market real wage induces labor reallocation from official to underground labor 
market while leaving total hours of work constant.  
Third, if both consumption and real wage arise proportionally, supply 
of labor in official labor market will fall for the reasons discussed above. (31) 
is useful as an alternative explanation to account for some important facts of 
long run economic growth. Among others, consumption and real wage tend to 
rise over time with relatively stable hours of work, while participation rate is 
inversely related to market output fluctuation.   
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Proposition 2 
Demand for cash balances is a function of market income, opportunity 
cost of holding cash balances, and taxation burden conditional on the 
fiscal regime. 
Proof. By applying similar procedures as in the proof of Proposition 1, we 
obtain  
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Demand for cash balances varies directly with market income and taxation 
burden, and inversely with nominal interest rate. ■ 
Taxation affects currency demand in such a way that rising taxation 
burden induces both household and firm to involve in “cash-only” activities to 
avoid certain tax payments. 
 
Proposition 3 
 The size of underground economy, as a share of market economy, is 
given by 
( )( )RtWttM
t
U
t
Y
Y ττ +−Λ= − 11         (33) 
Proof. Divide (32) by (17). As Ut
M
tt YYY += , some manipulation of algebra 
gives (33).■  
 
3. Estimates of the Size of Underground Economy 
 
In this section we will use the dynamic currency demand approach to 
estimate the size of underground economy in Malaysia spanning 1970-2005. 
Unlike the existing literature that uses currency demand approach, among 
others, Pickhardt and Pons (2006), and the reference cited, we derive the 
functions of demand for currency from dynamic general equilibrium 
framework.  
We specify equation (17) and (32), respectively, in log-log terms, that 
is: 
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3.1. The dynamic currency demand model estimates 
 
The dynamic currency demand model as in Equation (35) is estimated 
using annual data from 1970 to 2005 for Malaysia. In its most general form, 
demand for real currency can be written as: 
 
),,( ATRIRRGDPfRCC =     
 
The real currency, RCC, is measured by the currency in circulation 
deflated by consumer price index (2000 =100). The real currency demand 
function is modeled as a function of scale variable, for which we use real 
income, RGDP. To obtain a measurement of real income, the gross domestic 
product is deflated by consumer price index. Interest rate, IR, the opportunity 
cost on which the currency demand depends, refers to 3 month Treasury bill 
rate. Last but not least, we use average tax revenue ATR, as a proxy to 
taxation burden. All the data are sourced from International Financial 
Statistics of International Monetary Fund, except for currency in circulation 
and tax revenue obtained from Asia Development Banks’ key indicators on 
various issues.  
To ensure that the dynamic currency demand regression does not suffer 
from spurious regression, we examine the stationarity assumption for each and 
every variable under consideration. Table 2 reports the result of Augmented 
Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test, both in levels and first difference. The test 
result indicates that all the variables involved are only stationary in first 
difference. Upon this evidence, the OLS estimate of the dynamic currency 
demand regression in Equation (35) that assumes stationarity seems to be 
inappropriate and likely to produce spurious results. However, the possibility 
of cointegration among these variables in the model would allow further 
investigation of long run currency demand model. This is in view of what is 
coined the ‘superconsistency’ property of the OLS estimator for cointegrated 
series.  
 
Table 2: Results for ADF unit root test 
 Levels First Differences 
     Constant 
without trend 
    Constant 
with trend 
    Constant 
without trend 
    Constant 
with trend 
RCC 
RGDP 
ATR 
IR 
-2.4639 (1) 
-0.8249 (0) 
-2.3077 (0) 
-1.8370 (0) 
    -2.5515 (1) 
    -2.5383 (0) 
    -2.7715 (0) 
    -2.0256 (0) 
-7.8015 (0)  
-5.0560 (1)*** 
-6.2715 (0)*** 
-5.7654 (0)*** 
 -8.3987 (0)*** 
 -5.0880 (1)*** 
 -6.3030 (0)*** 
 -5.7486 (0)*** 
Notes: RCC = currency in circulation/ CPI, RGDP = gross domestic product/ CPI, ATR = 1 +  
tax revenue / GDP), IR = (1 + 3-month Treasury bill rate)/3-month Treasury bill rate. All 
variables are in natural logarithms, D denotes the first difference operator. Figure in brackets 
denotes the proper lag structure based on the AIC criteria. ***, **,* indicates rejection of the 
null hypothesis of nonstationary at the 1, 5, 10% level of significance. 
 
We then use Johansen and Jeselius (JJ) method in multivariate setting 
to examine the likely cointegration among the model variables. Table 3 
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assembles the results from the trace and maximal eigenvalue version of the JJ 
test. The evidence clearly suggests the presence of one nonzero cointegrating 
vector among the model variables, which, after all, allow us to estimate the 
long run currency demand model as in Equation (35). Table 4 shows the 
estimated result of the dynamic currency demand model with the Newey-West 
corrections5.  
 
Table 3: Johansen Juselius (1992) Multivariate cointegration test 
results 
 
      Hypothesized  number of     Max-Eigen          Trace 
        cointegrating vector(s)      Statistics  C.V.(95%)    Statistics  C.V.(95%) 
 
             None                 33.9899***   27.5843      55.3261***  47.8561 
At most 1                 16.8815         21.1316      21.3361      29.7971 
At most 2                   3.2515  14.2646       4.4547      15.4947 
At most 3                   1.2032    3.8415       1.2032        3.8415 
 
       Notes: see notes to Table 2. The tested cointegration contains for variables (RCDD, TAX,    
       RGDP, and IR). All variables in natural logarithms form. 
 
 
 
Table 4: OLS estimations with Newey-west corrections 
for dynamic currency demand model 
 
Variables   Coefficient  t-statistics 
Constant ( 0β )    -1.771***  -5.615 
                RGDP ( 1β )           0.865***     36.771 
IR ( 2β )    -0.301   -1.671 
ATR ( 3β )       1.742*    1.837 
DUM87     0.177***    4.823 
DUM99     0.186***    5.786 
       Notes: see notes to Table 2.N = 36. DUM = dummy variable.   
 
3.2 Estimation of underground economy 
 
From equation (36), an estimation of the size of the underground 
economy in Malaysia can be obtained, as shown in Figure 1. The estimated 
size is in the range of 27 to 48 percent of GDP with standard deviation of 5 
percent, in line with the findings of Habibullah and Eng (2006), and Schneider 
(2005). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The results of diagnostic tests are available upon request. 
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4. Fiscal regime consideration 
  
 The ad hoc currency demand approach is often criticized for 
considering taxation as the only cause and fiscal pressure induced by tax 
system as the only indicator of underground activities (Scheneider and Enste, 
2000, Pickhardt and Pons, 2006). Increasing tax rates drive households into 
underground activities to avoid the resultant higher tax burden, and vice versa.  
 However, the dynamic currency demand approach that also considers 
distorting taxation as the only cause of underground activities has offered new 
insight. Whether increasing tax rates could have induced households to 
participate in underground activities depends on its counterpart, that is, 
government expenditure. According to (33), if at date t the tax revenue 
collected is completely dispensed via government transfer, 1=Λ t , there is no 
room for underground economy. Put it differently, underground economy is 
consistent with any level of tax rates as long as the tax burden is offset by 
equivalent government transfer. 
 However, tΛ  rarely equals one. If the government is not able to levy 
non-distorting lump sum tax, reducing distorting tax rates accompanied by 
rising government expenditure may contribute to larger size of underground 
economy. The intuition is simple. As discussed in (31), households that react 
to even higher expected tax rate at date t + 1 will participate in underground 
activities. Unless ensued by a shrink in government expenditure at faster pace, 
one should not jump into the conclusion that lower tax rate could end in 
smaller size of underground economy. 
 On the flip side, increasing tax rates accompanied by shrinking 
government expenditure at date t would lead to a fall in the size of 
underground economy seeing that households expect a lower tax rate at date t 
+ 1. Higher tax rates drives households and firms into underground activities 
only if the fiscal condition deteriorates as the government expenditure 
explodes simultaneously. 
 After all, based on (31) and (33), we infer that it is not the current 
taxation burden that matters. Rather, it is the fiscal regime that affects both 
current and future taxation burdens that matters. Worsening (improving) fiscal 
conditions, with limited sources of taxation, tends to raise (lower) the 
expectation on future distorting tax rates, and thus cause larger (smaller) size 
of underground economy. Nevertheless, fiscal condition is less worrying if the 
government could impose other lump sum tax or less distorting indirect tax.  
 
4.1 Simulated size of underground economy adjusted for fiscal condition 
 
To compute the size of underground economy adjusted for fiscal 
regime, we first equate (33) and (36). Given the estimation results, we know 
that 01.213 =ββ  implies an approximate 33.0=Λ t . Second, as (33) uses 
the concept of average marginal tax rate while (36) the average tax rates, to 
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improve the comparability between (33) and (36) we compute the average 
marginal tax rate (AMTR) according to6  
ttt ATRAMTR )1( ε+=        (37) 
What follows next is the calculation of the annual tΛ from 1970 to 
2005. Indexed by 33.0=Λ t , and together with (37), we finally recompute the 
hypothetical size of underground economy adjusted for fiscal condition, 
shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: The size of underground economy adjusted for fiscal regime 
      
One could observe that the size of underground economy turns out to 
be relatively smaller, technically thanks to higher share of distorting tax 
revenue in total government spending. It is unsurprising, however, if we 
consider the government transfers to the household that partially offset the 
taxation burden in estimations. 
That captures the attention here is the trend of the fiscal-regime 
adjusted size of underground economy that diverges clearly from the 
conventional measurement since 1987 till 2000. The conventional 
measurement exhibits a growing size of underground activities from 1987 to 
1997, which, however, after being adjusted for fiscal condition, declines over 
time. In retrospect, this is due to the Malaysian fiscal consolidation after the 
1985 sovereign debt crises. In particular, the fiscal stance has been in surplus 
for the first half of 1990s. The improving fiscal condition, as discussed earlier, 
should lower the expectation on future taxation burdens, thereby driving the 
households out of the underground economy.    
 Worsening fiscal condition after 1997/98 financial crises, partly as an 
effort to alleviate the pains of recession, that implies an arising future taxation 
burden has put the underground economy on the path of arising since 1997, in 
contrast to the falling trend as in conventional measurement from 1997 to 
2000 that considers only the lower current average tax rates.  
 
   
                                                 
6 See appendix for the derivation of AMTR from ATR. 
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We believe that the estimates of the size of underground economy that 
takes fiscal regime into account offer a better illustration on its role as shock 
absorber. For instance, Busato and Chiarini (2004) argued that underground 
activities offer risk sharing opportunities by allowing households to smooth 
income through a proper labor allocation between market and underground 
sectors. One should expect rising, not falling, levels of underground activities 
as the formally unemployed workers substitute into underground economy 
during the economic recession (1997-98). Likewise, it is hardly acceptable that 
the households and firms will involve more actively in underground activities 
during economic good time (1987-1997).        
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The present paper attempts to add values to the use of conventional 
currency demand approach in estimating the size of underground economy by 
integrating this most widely used approach into a dynamic general equilibrium 
model. We then use the derived money demand function to estimate the size of 
underground economy in Malaysia for the period of 1970 – 2005. What makes 
the dynamic currency demand approach interesting and insightful is its general 
equilibrium analysis. In particular, we argue that it is not the current taxation 
burden per se as suggested in the conventional currency demand approach that 
matters. Instead, it is the fiscal regime that affects both current and future 
taxation burdens that matters. Whether increasing current tax rates could have 
induced households to participate in underground activities depends on the 
path of government expenditure. Higher current tax rates along with a cut in 
government spending that signal a lower future tax burdens may indeed 
produce a smaller size of underground economy. On the flipside, lower current 
tax rates combined with increasing government spending that hint at greater 
future tax burdens could kick off a rising size of underground economy.  
Also, we uncover that the trend of the size of underground economy, 
after taking the fiscal condition into account, is in line with the existing 
literature on the role of underground economy as risk-sharing mechanism. 
Specifically, expansionary fiscal stance occurs mostly during economic 
recession. To maintain the living standard one would see a switch of 
unemployed workers into the underground labor markets at the given wage 
rate. Similarly, firms should have used informal-labor intensive mode of 
productions for cost saving in the wave of market retrenchment. After all, the 
level of underground activities should be arising. In this respect, the dynamic 
currency demand approach performs better than the conventional currency 
demand approach that predicts a fall in the level.  
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Appendix 
 
By definition,  
Y
YTRATR )(=      (A1) 
where TR = total revenue, and is a function of total income, Y. Differentiating 
ATR against Y gives us  
2
)(1
Y
YTR
Y
TR
YY
ATR −


∂
∂=∂
∂      (A2) 
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Given that 
Y
TRAMTR ∂
∂= . Together with (A1), (A2) can be rearranged to 
yield 
 ( )ε+= 1ATRAMTR      (A3) 
where 
ATR
Y
Y
ATR ×∂
∂=ε  denotes the absolute income elasticity of average 
tax rate. 
 
